The FBI Says Gootloader Used Over 1,000 Hacked WordPress Sites for SEO Poisoning. Here's a Script to Check Yours
An FBI alert dated Nov. 16 says the Gootloader malware gang hid lure pages and hidden links on hacked WordPress sites to rank for legal searches, leading to more than $28 million in ransomware payments. We turned the FBI's warning signs into a free outside-in check and tested it on four large WordPress sites and a fake infected one.
The FBI's Gootloader alert of Nov. 16, 2026 says the gang had infected over 1,000 WordPress sites and controlled 216 domains, leading to more than $28 million in ransomware payments.
Gootloader used hacked WordPress sites as lure pages and redirectors, ranking them for low-competition legal searches with injected posts, hidden keyword links and arranged backlinks.
The FBI says the operator scanned for xmlrpc.php and used stolen credentials, so turning off XML-RPC if you don't use it and adding strong multi-factor sign-in are the first two fixes.
The FBI also tells site owners to watch Search Console for unrelated legal or business queries and sudden new indexed pages, which is where SEO poisoning shows first.
Our free check-wordpress.mjs script looks for five outside signs from the alert: XML-RPC logins, odd REST API routes, random-looking user names, hidden link blocks and encoded scripts, and legal-sounding posts.
Gootloader, a malware operation that hid its lure pages on hacked WordPress sites, had infected over 1,000 WordPress sites as of October 2026 and led to more than $28 million in ransomware payments, the FBI says. The figures are in an FBI FLASH alert dated November 16 (PDF), which Search Engine Roundtable flagged for the SEO world on November 17. Four days earlier, the US Justice Department announced that it had removed the malware from more than 100 servers, "including compromised WordPress sites", with police in Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, France, the UK and Australia and Europol.
For a site owner the lesson is simple: your WordPress site can be used to rank someone else's malware without anything on your home page looking wrong. Below is what the FBI says happened, the fixes it lists, and a short script we wrote that checks a site from the outside for the signs it describes.
What is Gootloader?
Gootloader is what the FBI calls an "initial access framework": malware that gets a foothold on a computer so ransomware gangs can follow. Since 2020 it has reached people through search. Someone searches for a specific legal document, such as a contract clause for their state, finds what looks like a forum thread or download on a real website, and downloads a ZIP file that holds malicious JavaScript.
According to the FBI alert:
The targets were legal professionals. The search terms were aimed at attorneys, in-house counsel, law firm partners, privacy teams and legal technology buyers.
The searches were low-competition on purpose. The FBI says the gang picked phrases with low search volume, often driven by jurisdiction-specific legal language, so its pages could rank next to legitimate resources.
The scale: over 1,000 infected WordPress sites and 216 domains controlled by the Gootloader administrator, as of October 2026. The Justice Department counts at least 25,000 infected computers worldwide since 2018 and at least 44 US ransomware victims.
How did it use WordPress sites?
This is the part that matters to anyone who runs a WordPress site, whatever its subject. The FBI says hacked sites served as lure pages, redirectors, traffic filters or relays, and lists how the operator got in and what it changed:
Getting in: the administrator scanned WordPress sites for xmlrpc.php, a login endpoint attackers use to guess passwords, then used stolen credentials and vulnerable plugins and themes.
What it changed: it injected posts, abused XML-RPC and REST API routes, and modified JavaScript files.
How it ranked: "hidden keyword links and arranged backlinks" pushed the lure pages up. The alert prints an example: a hidden list of links to dated paths ending in index.html, with anchor text like "Zoning Government Definition" and "Which Parent Will Get the Child Tax Credit".
Who saw it: a traffic distribution system filtered visitors by country, referrer, cookie or IP address. That is why an owner who visits their own site often sees nothing wrong.
The alert also lists other gangs abusing WordPress the same way, including fake plugins that add a REST route made of words and a random hex string, hidden must-use plugins in wp-content/mu-plugins, and hidden admin users with random hex names.
What does the FBI tell site owners to do?
The alert's WordPress table is the most useful checklist we have seen from a government agency on this. In short:
Patch automatically. Update WordPress core and trusted plugins and themes, and remove unused plugins, themes, accounts and staging sites.
Protect every admin login with multi-factor authentication, including hosting access.
Restrict XML-RPC. Disable xmlrpc.php if nothing uses it. If something does (some mobile apps and older integrations), rate-limit it and watch login volume.
Block PHP in uploads. Deny PHP execution under wp-content/uploads and run PHP as a non-privileged account.
Watch file integrity. Compare core files with WordPress's official checksums and alert on changed plugins, themes, mu-plugins, JavaScript, .htaccess and index files.
Watch search. Review Search Console and other webmaster tools for unrelated legal or business queries, sudden new indexed pages, manual actions and security warnings.
Keep logs off the server, so an attacker can't erase them.
If you think you have been hit, the FBI says to restrict public access while you keep a copy of files, database and logs, reset every credential from a clean computer, revoke sessions and application passwords, and restore from a clean backup only after closing the way in. It asks victims to report to their local FBI field office or ic3.gov. Outside the US, report to your national cybercrime agency as well.
A free script that checks your site from the outside
We turned the signs in the alert into a short Node.js script. It sends the same requests a browser or crawler sends, plus one harmless XML-RPC request that only asks which methods exist. It checks five things:
whether xmlrpc.php is on and offers login methods
whether /wp-json/ lists REST API routes with random-looking names
whether the public author list includes random hex user names
whether the home page has hidden blocks of links or inline scripts with long Base64 text
whether recent post titles mention legal documents, Gootloader's favorite lure
Save it as check-wordpress.mjs and run node check-wordpress.mjs https://your-site.com (Node 18 or newer):
// check-wordpress.mjs: outside-in checks for the WordPress abuse the FBI// described in its Nov. 16, 2026 Gootloader FLASH.// Usage: node check-wordpress.mjs https://example.com// A clean result is not proof of a clean site.const site = (process.argv[2] || '').replace(/\/$/, '');if (!site) { console.log('Usage: node check-wordpress.mjs https://your-site.com'); process.exit(1); }const UA = { 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (site owner self-check)' };const get = async (path, opts = {}) => { try { const r = await fetch(site + path, { headers: UA, redirect: 'follow', ...opts }); return { status: r.status, text: await r.text() }; } catch (e) { return { status: 0, text: '' }; }};const warn = (m) => console.log(' CHECK ' + m), ok = (m) => console.log(' ok ' + m);// 1. XML-RPC: the FBI says Gootloader's operator scanned for it.console.log('XML-RPC');const x = await get('/xmlrpc.php', { method: 'POST', headers: { ...UA, 'Content-Type': 'text/xml' }, body: '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>system.listMethods</methodName></methodCall>' });if (x.text.includes('<methodResponse>') && x.text.includes('wp.getUsersBlogs')) warn('xmlrpc.php is on and offers login methods (wp.getUsersBlogs). Turn it off if nothing uses it, or rate-limit it.');else ok(`xmlrpc.php answered ${x.status} without a login method list.`);// 2. REST API routes: look for namespaces that look machine-made.console.log('REST API routes');const j = await get('/wp-json/');let ns = [];try { ns = JSON.parse(j.text).namespaces || []; } catch {}if (!ns.length) ok(`/wp-json/ didn't list namespaces (status ${j.status}).`);else { const odd = ns.filter((n) => /[0-9a-f]{6,}/i.test(n) || /^[a-z]+-[a-z]+-[0-9a-f]{4,}/i.test(n)); console.log(` ${ns.length} namespaces: ${ns.join(', ')}`); odd.length ? warn(`random-looking namespaces: ${odd.join(', ')}. Match each to a plugin you installed.`) : ok('no random-looking namespaces.');}// 3. Public author list: hidden admin accounts often have random hex names.console.log('Users');const u = await get('/wp-json/wp/v2/users?per_page=100');try { const users = JSON.parse(u.text); if (!Array.isArray(users)) throw 0; console.log(` ${users.length} public authors: ${users.map((x) => x.slug).join(', ')}`); const hex = users.filter((x) => /^[0-9a-f]{6,}$/i.test(x.slug) || /^[a-z]{2,}[0-9a-f]{8,}$/i.test(x.slug)); hex.length ? warn(`random-looking user names: ${hex.map((x) => x.slug).join(', ')}`) : ok('no random-looking author names.');} catch { ok(`author list not public (status ${u.status}). Check Users in wp-admin yourself.`); }// 4. Home page: hidden link blocks and encoded scripts.console.log('Home page HTML');const html = (await get('/')).text;const hidden = [...html.matchAll(/<(div|ul|p|span)[^>]*style=["'][^"']*(display:\s*none|visibility:\s*hidden|left:\s*-\d{3,}px)[^"']*["'][^>]*>([\s\S]{0,4000}?)<\/\1>/gi)] .filter((m) => (m[3].match(/<a\s/gi) || []).length >= 3);hidden.length ? warn(`${hidden.length} hidden block(s) holding 3 or more links. View source and search for display:none.`) : ok('no hidden blocks of links found.');const b64 = [...html.matchAll(/<script[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/gi)] .filter((m) => /atob\(|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{400,}={0,2}/.test(m[1]) && !/application\/ld\+json/.test(m[0]));b64.length ? warn(`${b64.length} inline script(s) with long Base64 or atob(). Find out which plugin adds each one.`) : ok('no inline scripts with long Base64 text.');// 5. Latest posts: injected posts show up as titles you didn't write.console.log('Latest posts');const p = await get('/wp-json/wp/v2/posts?per_page=20&_fields=date,slug,title');try { const posts = JSON.parse(p.text); if (!Array.isArray(posts)) throw 0; for (const q of posts) console.log(` ${q.date.slice(0, 10)} ${q.title.rendered.slice(0, 80)}`); const legal = posts.filter((q) => /\b(law|legal|contract|agreement|clause|statute)\b/i.test(q.title.rendered)); legal.length ? warn(`${legal.length} recent title(s) mention legal documents, Gootloader's favorite lure. Make sure you wrote them.`) : ok('no recent titles about legal documents.');} catch { ok(`post list not public (status ${p.status}).`); }console.log('\nDone. Also check Search Console (Performance and Pages) for queries and pages you never wrote.');
How we tested it
On November 17 we ran the script against two kinds of target:
A fake infected site we served on our own computer, built from the alert's examples: XML-RPC switched on, a REST route named in the words-plus-hex style the FBI describes, a user named a3f9c2e81b, a hidden list of three index.html links, an atob() script, and a post titled like the alert's keyword list. The script flagged all six.
Four large public WordPress sites, a news site, a software blog, a government site and WordPress.org's own news blog. Nothing looked infected. XML-RPC was switched on with login methods on two of them (one had refused our first request with a 429 "too many requests" code, which shows rate limiting at work), and the title check flagged one ordinary post on another, because a word in it matched. That is why it says "make sure you wrote them" rather than calling anything malware.
Some sites block /wp-json/ or the author list entirely. The script reports that as fine and tells you to check in wp-admin, because it can't see past the block.
What the script can't see
Gootloader's traffic filter showed lure pages only to some visitors, by country, referrer, cookie or IP. A check from one computer may get the clean version. The script also can't see your files, database or admin users who have never published a post. So treat it as a quick first look, then:
Search Google for your own site plus legal words, such as site:yourdomain.com agreement or site:yourdomain.com law, and look for pages you never made.
Open Search Console's Performance report and sort queries by impressions. Legal or contract phrases on a site about something else are the clearest sign the FBI describes.
Check the Pages report for a sudden jump in indexed pages.
Ask your host to compare WordPress core files with the official checksums (WP-CLI's wp core verify-checksums does it) and to list everything in wp-content/mu-plugins.
Gootloader aimed its lures at legal professionals, but the hacked sites that hosted them could be about anything, so don't skip these checks because your site has nothing to do with law. For more on keeping a WordPress site healthy in search, see what to send while your site is down.
Kiran runs Kihan Marketing, a web design, SEO and ads agency, and manages dozens of websites across real estate, home services and healthcare. He writes about SEO, AI search and paid ads news, and what it means for the people who run websites.